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Comments
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.: Minnesota
Supreme Court Gives the Green Light to
Cigarette Plaintiffs
John Forster began smoking Camel cigarettes in 1954, at
age fifteen.'. After smoking for some twenty-five years, he at-
tempted to quit several times, without success.2 In November,
1984, Forster was diagnosed as having inoperable lung cancer.3
Three months later,4 Forster and his wife, Ann, sued R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company (Reynolds),5 the maker of Camel
cigarettes, for negligent failure to warn of the dangers of smok-
ing, strict liability for failure to warn and design defect, misrep-
resentation, and breach of express and implied warranty.6 Four
months after filing suit, John Forster died at age 46.7
Two years later, Reynolds moved for summary judgment,
alleging that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
1. Brief for Respondent at 11, Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437
N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989) (No. C1-87-2170). In a testimonial deposition, Forster
testified that he began smoking Camel cigarettes because he thought cigar-
ettes, as portrayed in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's (Reynolds) advertise-
ments, were "manly" and "glamorous." I&
2. I& at 12-13. Although he was aware of "very vague" claims of health
risks from smoking, Forster testified he was "not convinced that there were
any health hazards associated with cigarette smoking." Id. In 1979, after his
doctor recommended that he quit smoking, Forster tried several programs, but
was unable to stop. He testified that Reynolds' advertising, which depicted
smoking as "macho," hampered his attempts to stop smoking. I&
3. Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691, 692 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988).
4. The Forsters commenced suit in March, 1985. Id
5. The Forsters also sued Erickson Petroleum Corporation, doing busi-
ness as Holiday Station Stores, Inc., the retailer from whom Forster purchased
his cigarettes. Id. at 691. This Comment discusses only the suit against Rey-
nolds, the cigarette manufacturer.
6. The suit also included derivative claims for loss of consortium and pu-
nitive damages. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 657, 661-63.
7. Brief for Respondent at 13, Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437
N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989) (No. C1-87-2170). Before Forster's death, the parties
agreed that the action could be amended to a wrongful death suit. The amend-
ment had not been completed at the time of the lower court's summary judg-
ment ruling. Forster, 423 N.W.2d at 692.
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Act8 (Labeling Act) preempted all of Forster's state common
law claims.9 The district court granted summary judgment,10
but the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, finding no fed-
eral preemption of Forster's claims." The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the
Labeling Act preempted some but not all state common law
claims.'2
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. signals a green light
for plaintiffs who wish to sue cigarette manufacturers.13 The
Forster court, in reexamining the Labeling Act's preemption
and purpose clauses, proposed a more expansive test for deter-
mining which state common law claims survive the Labeling
Act than other courts that have addressed the issue.' 4
This Comment contends that the Forster decision took a
positive step in expanding the number of claims that survive
Labeling Act preemption. Part I discusses the history of law-
suits against cigarette manufacturers, emphasizing the effect of
preemption after the Labeling Act. Part II addresses the For-
ster court's reasoning and holding. Part III argues that
although Forster does not provide the perfect solution to deter-
mining Labeling Act preemption, its holding is more consistent
with the Labeling Act's language and legislative history than
the prevailing test in other states. The Comment observes that
the Forster preemption test could be construed to preempt even
those claims allowed in Forster, but asserts that Forster's result
8. See infra Part I. B.
9. Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 85-4294, slip op. at 1 (Henne-
pin County Dist. Ct., Minn., July 2, 1987). Defendants also moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that Forster failed to state a strict liability claim as a
matter of state law. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 657.
10. Forster, No. 85-4294, slip op. at 1. The judge granted summary judg-
ment on the preemption issue only, and did not rule on the strict liability is-
sue. Id at 11-12.
11. Forster, 423 N.W.2d at 701 (stating that "at the very heart of our rul-
ing is the firm conviction that if there is a need to immunize the tobacco indus-
try from tort liability, that decision must be made by Congress in an
unambiguous mandate and not by the courts").
12. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 660-62. For a fuller discussion of the Minnesota
Supreme Court's analysis and holding, see infra Part II. On remand from the
Minnesota Supreme Court, the district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint on
the merits. Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 85-4294, slip op. at 2
(Hennepin County Dist. Ct., Minn., Feb. 13, 1990).
13. Richard A. Daynard, head of the Tobacco Products Liability Project,
labeled the Minnesota Supreme Court's Forster ruling "a big green light for
tobacco litigation." Minn. Tobacco Ruling a 'Big Green Light'? Nat'l Law J.,
May 1, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
14. See infra Part II.
[Vol. 74:839
TOBACCO LITIGATION
should serve as a national model for future cigarette preemp-
tion cases.
I. HISTORY OF LAWSUITS AGAINST CIGARETTE
MANUFACTURERS
Cigarette smoking poses serious health risks - the Sur-
geon General has termed smoking "the single most important
preventable cause of death in our society."1 5 Cigarette smoking
is responsible for more than one of every six deaths in the
United States.1 6 In 1985 alone, approximately 390,000 Ameri-
cans died of smoking-related illnesses;' 7 cigarette smoking ac-
counted for 87% of lung cancer deaths, 82% of chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease deaths, 21% of coronary heart
disease deaths, and 18% of stroke deaths.' 8
A. THE EARLY CASES
Despite the magnitude of these health risks, cigarette man-
ufacturers have successfully escaped liability for injuries caused
by cigarette smoking.' 9 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, smok-
ers began suing cigarette manufacturers on theories of fraud,
negligence, and breach of warranty.20 Plaintiffs failed in all of
15. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SUR-
GEON GENERAL at 11 (1989). Even if all smokers were to quit smoking cigar-
ettes today, smoking would continue as "the leading cause of preventable,
premature death for many years to come." See Koop, Preface to id., at iv.
16. Id, at 11.
17. Id at 12.
18. IM at 161.
19. See Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Pro-
posal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1423-24 (1980) (contending that "only the to-
bacco industry can boast of defeating every attempt to hold it accountable for
injuries caused by its product"). An attorney for a major cigarette manufac-
turer recently bragged that the "industry's record remains unblemished in the
almost 40 years these cases have been pending. No judgment rendered against
the [cigarette] companies has stood up." Cohen, Broader Suits Over Cigarettes
May Be Possible, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1990, at A3, col. 4.
20. See, e.g., Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541, 542 (5th
Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (breach of implied warranty); Ross v. Philip Morris &
Co., 328 F.2d 3, 5 (8th Cir. 1964) (breach of implied warranty, negligence,
fraud, and deceit by false advertising); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
317 F.2d 19, 22 (5th Cir. 1963) (breach of implied warranty and negligence),
cerL denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70,
71 (5th Cir. 1962) (proceeding to the jury on theories of negligence and breach
of implied warranty), rev'd and remanded on rebg, 325 F.2d 673, 679 (5th Cir.
1963), cert denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964), rev'd and remanded, 391 F.2d 97, 106
(5th Cir. 1968), aff'd per curiam on reh'g en banc, 409 F.2d 1166, 1166 (5th Cir.
1990]
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these lawsuits.21 One reason was difficult evidentiary burdens.
For example, courts initially required plaintiffs who alleged
breach of implied warranty to prove that the cigarette manufac-
turers knew or reasonably should have foreseen the dangers of
lung cancer from cigarette use, a burden plaintiffs could not
meet.22  In Green v. American Tobacco Co.,2 the Florida
Supreme Court eliminated the foreseeability requirement,
holding that defendant's knowledge of the harm resulting from
cigarette use was not a prerequisite to liability for breach of im-
plied warranty.2 4 Nevertheless, the cigarette manufacturer pre-
vailed because the plaintiff failed to prove that cigarettes were
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co., 295 F.2d 292, 294 (3d Cir. 1961) (negligence and breach of express war-
ranty), rev'd and remanded, 350 F.2d 479, 487 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 987 (1966), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009
(1967); Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d 464, 465 (1st Cir. 1958)
(per curiam) (fraud by false advertising), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958).
A number of commentators have written about these early cigarette law-
suits. For an analysis of the first stage of cigarette lawsuits see Garner, supra
note 19, at 1425-28; Stein, Cigarette Products Liability Law in Transition, 54
TENN. L. REv. 631, 632-38 (1987); Comment, Products Liability - Can it Kick
the Smoking Habit?, 19 AKRON L. REv. 269, 273-80 (1985) [hereinafter Com-
ment, Smoking Habit]; Comment, Tobacco Under Fire: Developments in Judi-
cial Responses to Cigarette Smoking Injuries, 36 CATH. U.L. REv. 643, 646-52
(1987) [hereinafter Comment, Tobacco Under Fire]; Note, Tobacco Suits Today:
Are Cigarette Plaintiffs Just Blowing Smoke?, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 257, 257-61
(1989) [hereinafter Note, Tobacco Suits Today].
21. See Garner, supra note 19, at 1425-26 (arguing that early cases failed
because of tenacious defense tactics and unfavorable legal rulings).
22. See, e.g., Hudson, 427 F.2d at 542 (finding for the cigarette manufac-
turer because plaintiff could not prove the foreseeability of harm in cigarette
smoking); Ross, 328 F.2d at 10 (holding that plaintiff must prove defendant
reasonably could have suspected that smoking caused cancer); Lartigue, 317
F.2d at 39 (finding for cigarette manufacturer because plaintiff could not estab-
lish that at the time his cancer started, medical knowledge was such that de-
fendants could have anticipated by reasonable care that cigarettes could cause
cancer).
23. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), certified question answered, 154 So. 2d 169
(Fla. 1963), rev'd and remanded on reh'g, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert de-
nied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964), rev'd and remanded, 391 F.2d 97, 106 (5th Cir. 1968),
aff'd per curiam on reh'g en banc, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), cert denied,
397 U.S. 911 (1970).
24. Green, 154 So. 2d at 171. The procedural history is quite complex.
The case originated in federal district court, and went to the jury on theories
of breach of implied warranty and negligence. Green, 304 F.2d at 71. The jury,
however, found that the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen the
danger of smoking Lucky Strike cigarettes. Id. at 72. On appeal, the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed. Id. at 72-73. Because of the importance of the question, the
Florida Supreme Court certified and decided the question. 154 So. 2d at 170,
173.
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not reasonably fit for human consumption.25 In Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,2 6 the plaintiff lost after failing to
pursue a claim for breach of implied warranty.2 7 Thus, even
before the Labeling Act and preemption defenses, plaintiffs
were unsuccessful in lawsuits against cigarette manufacturers.
B. THE FEDERAL CIGAREITE LABELING AND ADVERTISING
ACT
1. The 1965 Labeling Act
In 1964, the Surgeon General's advisory committee released
its initial report on smoking and health, declaring cigarette
25. The complicated procedural history of Green continued after the Flor-
ida Supreme Court decision, when the case returned to the Fifth Circuit.
There, the circuit court held that implied warranty doctrine required a prod-
uct to be reasonably fit for human use or consumption. Green, 325 F.2d at 675.
The court reasoned that no breach of implied warranty existed unless plain-
tiffs could prove that cigarettes were not reasonably fit and wholesome, and
remanded for a new trial on the issue. I&i at 675, 678. On remand, the jury
found that cigarettes were reasonably fit for human consumption, and the
plaintiff again appealed. Id at 101.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the jury verdict, reasoning that Florida law en-
titled Mr. Green to rely on the implied assurances that Lucky Strike cigarettes
were wholesome and fit, and that Mr. Green's widow could hold the tobacco
company absolutely liable. Id at 106. A strong dissent argued that Florida law
did not impose strict liability without fault unless the product was defective.
Id at 111 (Simpson, J., dissenting). Here, Lucky Strike cigarettes were not
flawed or defective, but rather were exactly like all other cigarettes. Id at 110
(Simpson, J., dissenting).
The plaintiff's win was short-lived: the Fifth Circuit overruled its earlier
reversal, adopted the dissent's reasoning, and affirmed the earlier jury verdict.
Green, 409 F.2d at 1166.
26. 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), rev'd and remanded, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir.
1965), cert denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966),
cert, denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967).
27. In Pritchard, plaintiff sued on theories of negligent failure to warn
and breach of express warranty, but the jury found that no express warranties
existed, that defendant was not negligent, and that plaintiff had assumed the
risk. Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 481-82. The Third Circuit reversed the assumption
of risk finding and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 485. Plaintiff, however,
never pursued the new trial, stating that the burden of proof was "insur-
mountable." See Garner, supra note 19, at 1427 & n.42 (citing Letter from El-
mer Fried to Professor Garner (Oct. 2, 1974)).
Interestingly, the Third Circuit earlier had held that cigarettes were un-
merchantable if a smoker suffered injuries from smoking. Pritchard v. Liggett
& Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 1961). Plaintiff, however,
failed to bring a breach of implied warranty claim. Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 481-
82 (suing only for negligent failure to warn and breach of express warranty).
Professor Garner contends that the plaintiff could have prevailed had he pur-
sued the implied warranty claim. See Garner, supra note 19, at 1427-28.
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smoking a health hazard.28 Several states, as well as the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC), responded by adopting laws that
required a warning label on cigarette packages and advertise-
ments.29 In 1965, Congress also reacted to the Surgeon Gen-
eral's report, enacting the Labeling Act.30 The Act required all
cigarette packages to carry the warning label: "Caution: Cigar-
ette Smoking May be Hazardous to Your Health."31 The Label-
ing Act's primary purpose was to inform the public of the
health risks of smoking.32 The Act's other purposes included
28. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: RE-
PORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC
HEALTH SERV. (Jan. 11, 1964). The Report was one of the first official state-
ments linking cigarette smoking to lung cancer, chronic bronchitis, and em-
physema. Id. at 31.
29. For example, in June, 1965, the New York state legislature adopted a
law requiring the following label: "WARNING: Excessive Use Is Dangerous To
Health." Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 622 n.1 (1st Cir. 1987) (ci-
tation omitted).
The FTC also proposed a regulation requiring a warning on cigarette
packages and advertisements. See 29 Fed. Reg. 530-32 (1964) (proposed Jan. 17,
1964); 29 Fed. Reg. 8324-75 (1964) (proposed July 2, 1964). The regulation re-
quired either of the following statements on cigarette advertisements and
packages:
CAUTION - CIGARETTE SMOKING IS A HEALTH HAZARD:
The Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health
has found that 'cigarette smoking contributes substantially to mortal-
ity from certain specific diseases and to the overall death rate'; or
CAUTION: Cigarette smoking is dangerous to health. It may cause
death from cancer and other diseases.
29 Fed. Reg. at 531; 29 Fed. Reg. at 8326.
30. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1341 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). In 1969, Congress amended the Labeling
Act with the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222,
84 Stat. 87 (1970). The Labeling Act is codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1340 (1982). In 1984, Congress further amended the Labeling Act with
the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200
(1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (Supp. V 1987)).
For ease of identification, this Comment will refer to the original Labeling
Act as the "1965 Act," the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act as the "1969
Act," and the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act as the "1984 Act."
31. 1965 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982).
32. The House version of the Labeling Act stated that "[t]he principal
purpose of this Bill is to provide adequate warning to the public of the poten-
tial hazards of cigarette smoking." H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1,
reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 2350, 2350. Similarly, Rob-
ert Giles, general counsel of the Department of Commerce, stated:
One basic objective of each of these bills is the same - to protect the
health of consumers and prospective consumers of cigarettes. H.R.
3014 and H.R. 4007 have the additional stated objective of protecting
commerce and the national economy. While we would ordinarily
strongly support both objectives, we feel that.., the proposed means
of attaining the latter objective may be incompatible with the health
[Vol. 74:839
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protecting the national economy and ensuring a uniform sys-
tem of cigarette warning labels.3 3
Significantly, the Labeling Act included a preemption
clause. 34 Subsection 1334(a) preempted states from requiring
statements pertaining to smoking and health on cigarette pack-
ages labeled in compliance with the Labeling Act.35 This sub-
section applied only to cigarette packages.36 Subsection 1334(b)
applied only to advertising, and preempted requiring any warn-
ings on cigarette advertisements, as long as the packages of the
advertised cigarettes were labeled in compliance with the La-
beling Act.3 7 Subsection 1334(c) prohibited the FTC from re-
quiring warnings in cigarette advertising, but stated that the
Labeling Act did not affect the FTC's authority to regulate un-
fair or deceptive practices in cigarette advertisements.38 This
protection objective. Under such circumstances we believe that the
public health interest must prevail.
Letter from Robert Giles, general counsel of the Dep't of Comm. (Apr. 7,
1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AnMIN. NEws 2361, 2361.
33. The Labeling Act included the following statement of purpose:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this Act, to
establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette la-
beling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smok-
ing and health, whereby-
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking
may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on
each package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to
the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not
impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and
advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health.
1965 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
34. Id. § 1334.
35. Id § 1334(a). Subsection 1334(a) read: "No statement relating to
smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 1333 of this
title, shall be required on any cigarette package."
36. Id.
37. Id § 1334(b). Subsection 1334(b) read: "No statement relating to
smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this
chapter."
38. Id. § 1334(c). In light of the Labeling Act, the FTC vacated its pro-
posed requirements, see supra note 29, but expressly stated that it did not
modify the findings and conclusions that led it to require warning labels on
cigarette packages and advertisements. See 30 Fed. Reg. 9484-85 (1965) (pro-
posed July 28, 1965). The FTC also stated that during the period that the La-
beling Act prevented it from requiring a health statement on cigarette
advertisements, it would continue to monitor cigarette advertising and promo-
tional practices and take whatever action it could, consistent with the Labeling
Act, to prohibit unfair and deceptive cigarette advertisements. Id. at 9485.
1990]
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restriction on the FTC's authority to impose advertising re-
quirements expired on July 1, 1969.39
2. The 1969 and 1984 Amendments
Shortly before the Labeling Act's July 1, 1969 expiration
date, the FTC again proposed a warning requirement for cigar-
ette advertising.40 Congress responded with the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,41 making four notable amend-
ments to the original 1965 Act. First, Congress altered the
warning label on cigarette packages to read: "Warning: The
Surgeon General Has Determined that Cigarette Smoking is
Dangerous to Your Health."4 2 Again, Congress required no
warning on advertisements. Second, Congress banned all cigar-
ette advertising on television and radio after January 1, 1971.43
Third, the 1969 Act extended the restriction prohibiting the
FTC from requiring a warning label in print cigarette adver-
tisements until July 1, 1971." After that date, however, Con-
gress gave the FTC the authority to promulgate a regulation
requiring a warning label on cigarette advertisements. 45 Fi-
nally, Congress amended subsection 1334(b) of the preemption
39. 1965 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
40. See 34 Fed. Reg. 7917-18 (1969) (proposed May 20, 1969). The FTC
stated:
Unless Congress should extend the provisions of the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act expiring on July 1, 1969, so as
to bar such action, the Commission, relying upon its 1964 Findings
and having reason to believe that cigarette smoking creates hazards to
health which should clearly be disclosed to the public in all cigarette
advertisements, proposes to readopt its 1964 Trade Regulation Rule,
modified to read as follows:
In connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution in
commerce ... of cigarettes, it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice
... to fail to disclose, clearly and prominently, in all advertising that
cigarette smoking is dangerous to health and may cause death from
cancer, coronary heart disease, chronic bronchitis, pulmonary emphy-
sema, and other diseases.
I& at 7917.
41. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84
Stat. 87 (1970).
42. 1969 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982).
43. 1& § 1335.
44. Id. § 1336.
45. Id Section 1336 required the FTC to notify Congress six months
before any such rule went into effect, "in order that the Congress may act if it
so desires."
In 1972, the FTC required major cigarette manufacturers - Philip Morris,
American Brands, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. and Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. - to place the 1969 warning label on all
cigarette advertisements. See In re Lorillard, 80 F.T.C. 455, 460-65 (1972).
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clause, forbidding any "requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health... under State law. ''46
In 1984, Congress again amended the Labeling Act,47 re-
quiring cigarette manufacturers to rotate four warning labels. 48
In addition, Congress for the first time required the same warn-
ings on all print advertisements49 and billboards50 as well as on
cigarette packages. Congress amended the Act's purpose clause
to reflect this change.51
46. 1969 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1982). Congress amended subsection
1334(b) to read: "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion
of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the pro-
visions of this chapter." For the original language in the 1965 Act's subsection
1334(b), see supra note 37. The language of section 1334(a) remained the
same. See supra note 35.
For legislative history concerning the amendment to subsection 1334(b),
see S. REP. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AnMIN. NEws 2652, 2663 (discussing Senate's proposed amendment to pre-
emption clause); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 897, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2676, 2677 (discussing conference com-
mittee's suggested compromise to the Senate's proposed preemption clause);
see also infra notes 171, 174-176, 181-182 and accompanying text (discussing
the Senate and Conference Reports).
47. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat.
2200 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1341 (Supp. V. 1987). For legislative
history on the 1984 amendments, see H.R. 3979, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)
(proposing legislation to amend the Labeling Act); H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13-22, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3718,
3726-35 (detailing Committee on Energy and Commerce's proposed changes to
H.R. 3979); see also infra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing H.R.
3979).
48. The 1984 Act requires cigarette manufacturers to rotate the following
four warning labels on cigarette packages and advertisements:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer,
Heart Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now
Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women
May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Car-
bon Monoxide.
1984 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
49. Id, § 1331(a)(2).
50. Id. § 1333(a)(3).
51. Congress amended the purpose clause to include health warnings in
cigarette advertisements: "(1) the public may be adequately informed about
any adverse health effects of cigarette smoking by inclusion of warning notices
on each package of cigarettes and in each advertisement of cigarettes.... ." Id.
§ 1331(1). For the earlier language of the purpose clause, see supra note 33.
1990]
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C. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The most disputed issue concerning the Labeling Act is
preemption.5 2 Congress derives its power to preempt state law
from the supremacy clause of the Constitution.5 3 Although the
preemption doctrine defies a general formula,m courts have
recognized that Congress may preempt state laws expressly or
by implication.55 Express preemption occurs when Congress
explicitly bars parallel state law.56 Historically, express pre-
emption requires a very clear statement from Congress that
parallel state laws are prohibited.57
Congress also may impliedly preempt state regulation. In
analyzing an implied preemption issue, courts first determine
whether Congress intended to regulate an area exclusively, or
to "occupy the field."5 8 Congress's intent to occupy a particular
area is shown either by the scope of federal involvement,59 or
52. See infra note 77.
53. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
54. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1940) (stating that there is no
"infallible constitutional test" or any "one crystal clear distinctly marked
formula" for determining the validity of state laws when federal laws exist in
the same area).
55. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-
53 (1982) (stating that "[p]reemption may be either express or implied, and 'is
compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's lan-
guage or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose"' (quoting Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
56. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983) (noting that "within constitutional limits
Congress may pre-empt state authority by so stating in express terms").
57. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983) (holding
that ERISA expressly preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan"); De la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
at 147 (holding preempted state law restricting use of due-on-sale clauses in
mortgages when federal regulation expressly authorized federal savings and
loan associations to enforce such clauses, and required that such clauses must
be governed "exclusively by Federal law").
58. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); see also Note, Preemption of Recovery in Cigar-
ette Litigation: Can Manufacturers Be Sued for Failure to Warn Even Though
They Have Complied with Federal Warning Requirements?, 20 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 867, 871-75 (1987) (discussing preemption by occupation of the field).
59. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (ex-
plaining that "[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to
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the importance of the federal interest.60 When Congress has
not fully occupied a particular field, implied preemption still
may apply to the extent state law "actually conflicts" with fed-
eral law.61 An actual conflict occurs when compliance with
both state and federal law is impossible.62 An actual conflict
may be more subtle, however, such as when state law frustrates
congressional objectives.63 This type of implied preemption
normally requires fairly narrow and concrete congressional
objectives.64
Courts employ a presumption against preemption.6 5 Their
reluctance is based on federalism concerns;66 namely, courts
hesitate to usurp a state's exercise of valid police powers,67 par-
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it").
60. Id (stating that a congressional act "may touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to pre-
clude enforcement of state laws on the same subject").
61. See, e.g., Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713 (noting that "[e]ven
where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in a specific
area, state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law"); see also Note, supra note 58 at 875-78 (discussing implied preemption by
"actual conflict").
62. See, e.g., McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 133-34 (1913) (holding
state law preempted when labeling in compliance with federal law would
cause the product to be mislabeled under state law).
63. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (holding preempted any
state law that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress"). For example, state laws that
discourage conduct that federal law promotes are invalidated. See, e.g., Nash v.
Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 239 (1967) (holding preempted a state un-
employment compensation law that denied benefits to otherwise eligible appli-
cants who had filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor
Relations Board, when the National Labor Relations Act sought to encourage
the filing of such charges).
64. L. TRIBE, AmERICAN CoNSTrUTIoNAL LAW 482-89 (2d ed. 1988). Pro-
fessor Tribe argues:
[W]hile state action is preempted if it specifically frustrates fairly nar-
row and concrete objectives that underlie federal enactments, no such
conclusion follows where the most that can be said is that the direc-
tion in which state law pushes someone's actions is in general tension
with broad or abstract goals that may be attributed to various federal
laws or programs.
Id at 487 (footnote omitted).
65. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (noting a pre-
sumption that "Congress did not intend to displace state law"); see also L.
TRIBE, supra note 64, at 479 & n.7 (noting a reluctance to infer preemption).
66. See L. TRIBE, supra note 64, at 479-80 (stating that courts' reluctance
to infer preemption is "particularly appropriate in light of the Supreme
Court's repeated emphasis on the central role of Congress in protecting the
sovereignty of the states") (footnote omitted).
67. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (noting
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ticularly in matters relating to health and safety.68 The current
United States Supreme Court increasingly has refused to find
preemption absent clear congressional language. 69 In CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp.,70 for example, the Court upheld a state law
that limited hostile corporate takeovers, despite the existence
of a federal law that regulated takeovers.71
The presumption against preemption is strengthened when
preemption would leave a plaintiff without an adequate rem-
edy.7 2 When the presumption is rebutted, however, Congress
may preempt state common law as well as state statutes.73
Courts acknowledge that damage awards from state common
law claims may regulate a defendant's conduct as effectively as
a state statute.
74
that when Congress "is said to have pre-empted [matters] ... traditionally oc-
cupied by the States... 'we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress"' (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
68. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985) (noting that "the regulation of health and safety
matters is primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern").
69. Rotunda, Sheathing the Sword of Federal Preemption, 5 CONST. COM-
MENTARY 311, 312-21 (1988). Professor Rotunda argues:
A careful analysis of the current cases offers strong evidence that the
trend of the law is increasingly moving away from preemption. In re-
cent years, the Supreme Court has already gone far towards keeping
the preemption blade in its sheath. Or, to shift metaphors, before a
plaintiff is able to convince a federal court to rule in favor of preemp-
tion, that plaintiff must overcome new, higher barriers, jump over
more hurdles.
Id. at 312.
70. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
71. Id at 72-75, 86-87. Professor Rotunda asserts that CTS Corp. demon-
strates that "[a]ny obstacles that the state sets up must be fairly high before
the Court will infer preemption." Rotunda, supra note 69, at 318. For a more
thorough discussion of CTS Corp., see infra notes 204-06 and accompanying
text.
72. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984) (stating
that "it is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove
all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct").
73. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963) (noting that Congress's
power "is no less when the state power which it displaces would otherwise
have been exercised by the state judiciary rather than by the state
legislature").
74. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247
(1959) (noting that "regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award
of damages as through some form of preventive relief").
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D. PREEMPTION IN CIGARETTE CASES
The scope of the Labeling Act's preemption provisions has
been vigorously debated. 75 The Labeling Act clearly prohibits
state legislatures or agencies from requiring a different warn-
ing on cigarette packages and advertising than the warning re-
quired by Congress.76 The more controversial issue is whether
the Labeling Act also preempts state common law claims.77
75. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
76. The plain language of § 1334 precludes state legislatures from requir-
ing a different warning. See supra notes 35-37 and 46. Courts have not
doubted that state statutes are preempted. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that the district court "did
not question that the [Labeling] Act prohibits state legislatures from requiring
a warning on cigarette packages that alters that provided in section 1333").
77. A number of commentators have written on the preemption issue. See
Crist & Majoras, The "New" Wave in Smoking and Health Litigation - Is
Anything Really So New?, 54 TENN. L. REv. 551, 566-82 (1987) (arguing that
the Labeling Act preempts all common law claims); Edell, Cigarette Litiga-
tion: The Second Wave, 22 TORT & INs. L.J. 90, 90, 103 (1986) (arguing that
although defendants have enjoyed immunity from liability thus far, plaintiffs
will win in due time); Stein, supra note 20, at 646-70 (discussing strict liability);
Note, Federal Pre-emption and the Cigarette Act - The Smoke Gets in Your
Eyes, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897, 912-23 (1988) (arguing that the Palmer court ig-
nored legislative history to reach the wrong result); Note, Preemption of State
Common Law Actions Against Cigarette Manufacturers by the Federal Cigar-
ette Labeling and Advertising Ackr Have Smokers Taken Their Last Puff to
Hold Tobacco Companies Liable Under a State Tort Claim?, 10 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 467, 476-86 (1988) (arguing that the Palmer decision effectively eliminates
cigarette manufacturer liability suits); Comment, Tobacco Under Fire, supra
note 20, at 655-66 (contending that failure to warn claims should not be pre-
empted); Comment, The Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers for Lung Can-
cer: An Analysis of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and
Preemption of Strict Liability in Tort Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 76
KY. L.J. 569, 584-96 (1987-88) [hereinafter Comment, Liability of Cigarette
Manufacturers] (arguing that the Labeling Act preempts failure to warn
claims, and that courts should use the risk-utility analysis for design defect
claims); Note, supra note 58, at 896-919 (arguing that Congress did not intend
to preempt common law causes for failure to warn against the cigarette indus-
try); Note, Federal Preemption of Cigarette Products Liability Claims Creates
a Need for Congressional Action, 6 REV. OF LITIG. 339, 354-73 (1987) (arguing
that Cipollone and Palmer are well-reasoned, but questioning Congress's pol-
icy of immunizing cigarette manufacturers from tort liability); Note, Liability
of Cigarette Manufacturers for Smoking Induced Illnesses and Deaths, 18
RUTGERS L.J. 165, 175-89 (1986) (discussing potential winning legal theories for
plaintiffs, and the assumption of risk defense); Comment, Common Law
Claims Challenging Adequacy of Cigarette Warnings Preempted Under the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965: Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 754, 762-69 (1986) [hereinafter Comment,
Common Law Claims] (arguing that the Cipollone court erred in holding com-
mon law tort claims preempted); Comment, Strict Products Liability on the
Move: Cigarette Manufacturers May Soon Feel the Heat, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1137, 1148-56 (1986) (arguing that the best path to recovery is by liberal appli-
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Although no court has held that the Labeling Act expressly
preempts state common law claims,78 all courts deciding this is-
sue have found implied preemption of at least some state com-
mon law claims.79
The first judicial determination of the scope of Labeling
cation of strict products liability doctrine and comparative negligence); Note,
Preemption of State Common Law Actions Against Cigarette Manufacturers
by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act- Has Federalism Gone
Up in Smoke?, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 789, 805-08 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Has Federal-
ism Gone Up In Smoke?] (arguing that the Cipollone court failed to ade-
quately consider federalism concerns, and incorrectly preempted state
common law claims); Note, Tobacco Suits Today, supra note 20, at 268-78 (ar-
guing that the Cipollone victory is not as promising to cigarette plaintiffs as it
first appeared); Comment, The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
Preempts State Common-Law Damage Actions Challenging Either the Ade-
quacy of the Act's Warnings or the Propriety of the Advertising Practices of a
Cigarette Manufacturer that Has Complied with the Act, 32 VILL. L. REv. 875,
882-93 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Federal Cigarette Labeling] (arguing that
Cipollone was wrongly decided and the Labeling Act should not preempt state
common law claims).
A number of other commentators have written more generally on cigar-
ette litigation. See Garner, supra note 19, at 1434-65 (discussing potential
theories that plaintiffs might plead, defenses that cigarette manufacturers are
likely to raise, and problems of causation, assessment of damages, multiple de-
fendants, and statute of limitations); Levin, The Liability of Tobacco Compa-
nies - Should Their Ashes Be Kicked?, 29 ARIz. L. REV. 197, 198-99, 204-45
(1987) (discussing the health hazards of cigarette smoking and advocating full
liability for cigarette manufacturers); Comment, Smoking Habit, supra note
20, at 282-92 (discussing possible theories of liability against cigarette manufac-
turers, particularly strict liability); Note, The Great American Smokeout Hold-
ing Cigarette Manufacturers Liable for Failure to Provide Adequate Warnings
of the Hazards of Smoking, 27 B.C.L. REv. 1033, 1053-74 (1986) (arguing that
cigarette manufacturers should be held liable for failure to warn); Note, The
Smoldering Issue in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc-- Process Concerns in De-
termining Whether Cigarettes are a Defectively Designed Product, 73 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 606, 615-27 (1988) (analyzing the risk-utility theory); Note,
Plaintiffs' Conduct as a Defense to Claims Against Cigarette Manufacturers,
99 HARV. L. REV. 809, 818-27 (1986) (arguing that traditional plaintiff conduct
defenses may not be justified in products liability cases against cigarette manu-
facturers); Comment, Judicial and Legislative Control of the Tobacco Indus-
try: Toward A Smoke-Free Society?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 325-41 (1987)
(suggesting that although both judicial and legislative avenues are feasible
means of increasing public awareness of health hazards associated with to-
bacco, legislative controls have been more effective than judicially imposed
sanctions).
78. See Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that "the Act does not expressly preempt [plaintiff's] products liabil-
ity claims. We note that the courts of appeal are in complete agreement on
this question" (citing Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234
(6th Cir. 1988)); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 625 (1st Cir. 1987);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1986)).
79. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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Act preemption was the landmark case of Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.8 0 After summarily rejecting the express preemp-
tion of state common law claims,81 the Cipollone court turned
to implied preemption. 2 The court found that Congress did not
intend to "occupy the field" relating to cigarettes and health,83
but that some state common law claims against cigarette manu-
facturers would "actually conflict" with the Labeling Act. 84 In
finding this actual conflict, the Cipollone court employed a
"balance of purposes" theory.8 5 The Cipollone court reasoned
that the Labeling Act represented a careful balance between
the purposes of warning the public about the hazards of smok-
ing and protecting the national economy,8 6 and that warning re-
quirements that upset this balance should be preempted.8 7 The
80. 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987). At the
trial court level, New Jersey District Court Judge Sarokin held that the Label-
ing Act neither expressly nor impliedly preempted state common law claims.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1153-55, 1159-63 (D.N.J.
1984).
81. The Cipollone court held that the language of § 1334 did not dearly
encompass state common law claims, particularly in light of the presumption
against preemption. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 185. Further, the Labeling Act con-
tained neither a clause explicitly preempting state common law claims (as in
the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1972)), nor a savings clause ex-
pressly preserving those claims (as in the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1982)). Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 185 n.5.
82. In analyzing implied preemption, the Cipollone court refused to con-
sider legislative history. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 186 ("[W]e find the language of
the statute itself a sufficiently clear expression of congressional intent without
resort to the Act's legislative history" (citations omitted)). At least one com-
mentator has argued that this omission caused the wrong result. See Com-
ment, Common Law Claims, supra note 77, at 761 (arguing that the Cipollone
court erred in failing to consider the legislative history of the Labeling Act).
83. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 186. The court noted some evidence of intent to
occupy the field in the sweeping language of the preemption clause, and in
Congress's purpose of establishing a "comprehensive Federal program" to
avoid "diverse, non-uniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising
regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health." Id
Given the presumption against preemption, however, the court declined to
find occupation of the field, explaining.
In light of this constraint, we cannot say that the scheme created by
the Act is 'so pervasive' or the federal interest involved 'so dominant'
as to eradicate all of the Cipollones' claims. Nor are we persuaded
that the object of the Act and the character of obligations imposed by
it reveal a purpose to exert exclusive control over every aspect of the
relationship between cigarettes and health.
Id. (citations omitted).
84. Id at 186-87.
85. Id at 187. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
86. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
87. The court noted:
Moreover, the preemption provision of section 1334, read together
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court concluded that damages resulting from successful state
common law claims could lead to non-uniform warnings,88 thus
upsetting the Act's balance of purposes, and therefore should
be preempted.8 9
The Cipollone court then created a preemption test, hold-
ing preempted state common law claims that challenge the ade-
quacy of warnings on cigarette packages or that necessarily
presume a duty to provide a warning beyond Labeling Act re-
quirements.90 In the "propriety" part of its test, the court also
held preempted state common law claims that challenge "the
propriety of a party's actions with respect to the advertising
and promotion of cigarettes." 91 The Cipollone court remanded
the case to the trial court with directions to apply the test to
plaintiff's claims.92
with section 1331, makes clear Congress's determination that this bal-
ance would be upset by either a requirement of a warning other than
that prescribed in section 1333 or a requirement or prohibition based
on smoking and health 'with respect to the advertising or promotion'
of cigarettes.
Id (emphasis in original).
88. Id. at 187 (accepting "appellants' assertion that the duties imposed
through state common law damage actions have the effect of requirements
that are capable of creating 'an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress"' (citations omitted)).
89. The court concluded that "claims relating to smoking and health that
result in liability for noncompliance with warning, advertisement, and promo-
tion obligations other than these prescribed in the Act have the effect of tip-
ping the Act's balance of purposes and therefore actually conflict with the
Act." Id.
90. Id These two clauses of the preemption test appear to relate to
§ 1334(a), although the Cipollone court did not expressly state this.
91. Id. For ease of identification, this part of the Cipollone test will be re-
ferred to as the "propriety" part. The Cipollone court appears to derive the
"propriety" part of its test from the language of § 1334(b). See supra notes 37,
46.
92. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 188. Applying the Third Circuit's preemption
test, Judge Sarokin on remand held preempted plaintiff's claims of failure to
warn, express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to de-
fraud, to the extent that they sought to challenge the defendant's advertising,
promotional, and public relations activities after January 1, 1966, the effective
date of the Labeling Act. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664,
669, 673-75 (D.N.J. 1986). Judge Sarokin held that the Act did not preempt the
plaintiff's design defect and risk-utility claims. Id. at 669-72.
In a later pretrial ruling, however, Judge Sarokin held that the retroactive
application of the New Jersey Products Liability Act barred the plaintiff's
risk-utility claims. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 83-2864, slip op. at 2-6
(D.N.J. Oct. 27, 1987). On appeal, the Third Circuit disagreed, noting however
that the New Jersey Supreme Court was considering this issue in another to-
bacco case, (Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 225 N.J. Super. 375,
542 A.2d 919 (App. Div.), appeal granted, 113 N.J. 379, 550 A.2d 482 (1988)),
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The following year, the First Circuit decided Palmer v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc.93 The Palmer court, as in Cipollone, found im-
plied preemption, 94 but even further emphasized the "balance
of purposes" reasoning. The court noted that Congress had
"run a hard-fought, bitterly partisan battle" to strike an effec-
tive balance between the dual policies of health and trade regu-
lation,95 and could not have intended a "single jury in a single
state" to supersede this compromise.9 This broad purposes lan-
guage seemed to suggest that most, if not all, state common law
claims would be preempted as upsetting the Labeling Act's bal-
ance of purposes.9 7
Subsequent federal and state courts have uniformly
and that it would follow the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision. Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 578 (3d Cir. 1990).
After five years of discovery, the matter went to trial on a claim for design
defect, and pre-1966 claims for failure to warn, express warranty, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and conspiracy claims. Id at 553. At the close of plaintiff's
case, the trial judge granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on
the design defect claim. Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. at 1493-95. After a four month
trial, the jury awarded $400,000 for breach of express warranty, but rejected
plaintiff's pre-1966 fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy to defraud
claims. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 553-55.
On appeal, the Third Circuit threw out the verdict and ordered a new
trial. Id. at 583. Thus, after six years of litigation, $3 million in fees incurred
by the plaintiff's counsel, and more than $50 million in fees incurred by the
cigarette manufacturers' counsel, the case returned to the trial court for an-
other trial. See Cohen, Broader Suits Over Cigarettes May Be Possible, Wall.
St. J., Jan. 8, 1990, p. A3, col. 4.
93. 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987), later proceeding sub nom. Public Citizen v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 838
(1989).
94. Id. at 625. Plaintiff originally pleaded negligence, breach of warranty,
and violations of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act. I& at 622. The
district court found no preemption. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1173. On appeal,
the First Circuit noted that "[a]t bottom," Palmer's claim was for inadequate
warning, and held inadequate warning claims preempted. Palmer, 825 F.2d at
622, 629.
95. 825 F.2d at 626. Interestingly, the Palmer court cited no legislative
history to support this assertion and specifically declined to "resort to legisla-
tive history to determine congressional intent." Id.
96. Id The court further stated that allowing "interposition of state com-
mon law actions into a well-defined area of federal regulation would abrogate
utterly the established scheme of health protection as tempered by trade pro-
tection," and would seriously disrupt Congress's "calibrated balance of na-
tional interests." Id- at 626, 629.
97. Using this balancing analysis, cigarette manufacturers argue that all
common law claims "tip" the careful balance. For example, Reynolds has ar-
gued that all common law claims must be preempted because each "disturbs
Congress' regulatory balance too much by seeking to impose warning require-
ments in addition to Congress' warnings or to prohibit the sale of cigarettes."
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adopted the Cipollone and Palmer reasoning and holding.9 8
Based on this reasoning, however, some later courts added a
third part to Cipollone's preemption test - holding preempted
claims that seek to have a jury reweigh Congress's regulatory
balance of interests as expressed in the Act.9 9 Not surprisingly,
Brief of Respondent R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. at 11, Forster v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (No. Cl-87-2170).
At least one court has read Palmer this broadly. See Pennington v. Vis-
tron Corp., No. 83-1332-A, slip op. at 8 (M.D. La. Dec. 22, 1987) (stating that
"[n]o court, to our knowledge, has expressly held that the Act preempts all
state tort claims for harm caused by the smoking of properly labeled cigar-
ettes, although Palmer v. Liggett Group might be construed to so imply" (cit-
ing Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626-28)). The trial court in Pennington held
preempted all of plaintiff's post-1965 claims. Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876
F.2d 414, 418-19 n.4 (5th Cir. 1989). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit narrowed the
preemption, holding preempted post-1965 failure to warn claims, but allowing
a claim for strict liability. 1d. at 427.
98. For federal court decisions, see Pennington, 876 F.2d at 417-23 (relying
on Cipollone and Palmer); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313
(11th Cir. 1987) (adopting the Cipollone court's reasoning) (citation omitted);
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1988) (re-
lying on both Cipollone and Palmer in holding preempted plaintiff's claims for
failure to provide adequate warnings); Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485, 486 (E.D. Pa.) (deciding a different issue, but stating
that the trial court relied on Cipollone), ffl'd, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Gi-
anitsis v. American Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 859-60 (D.N.H. 1988) (rely-
ing on Palmer); Herlihy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 85-3888-MA, slip op.
(D. Mass. 1988) (WESTLAW, State, MA, MA-CS) (relying on Palmer); Kotler
v. American Tobacco Co., 685 F. Supp. 15, 16 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (analyzing plain-
tiff's claims under Palmer), partial summary judgment granted, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1743.
For published state court decisions, see Dewey v. Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp., 225 N.J. Super. 375, 380, 542 A.2d 919, 921 (App. Div. 1988) (stat-
ing that "[s]ubstantial federal authority construing the preemption provisions
accords with Cipollone and is persuasive on this point"), appeal granted, 113
N.J. 379, 550 A.2d 481 (1988); Phillips v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 769 S.W.2d
488, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (finding Palmer and other federal circuit court
opinions persuasive), appeal denied, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 219.
For unpublished state and federal decisions following Cipollone and
Palmer, see Brief of Appellant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. at 19-20 & n.12, For-
ster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989) (No. C1-87-
2170) (listing three more federal cases and 13 more state cases).
In addition to the cases cited by Reynolds, see Viola v. American Brands,
Inc., No. 85-2496-WD, slip op. (D. Mass. July 14, 1989) (following Cipollone pre-
emption test), reprinted in Current Opinions, 4.9 Tobacco Prod. Liab. Rep.
(TPLR) 2.121, 2.121 (1989); Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. C87-2106,
slip op. (Marion County Cir. Ct., Ind., Feb. 9, 1989) (following Palmer), re-
printed in Current Opinions, 4.4 Tobacco Prod. Liab. Rep. (TPLR) 2.49, 2.51
(1989); McSorley v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 6418/81, slip op. (Queens County
Sup. Ct., N.Y., Dec. 30, 1988) (following Cipollone and Palmer), reprinted in
Current Opinions, 4.3 Tobacco Prod. Liab. Rep. (TPLR) 2.47, 2.47 (1989).
99. See, e.g., McCuan v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 288330, slip op. at 2-3 (Con-
tra Costa County Super. Ct., Cal., Apr. 28, 1988) (holding preempted claims for
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courts have disagreed about which claims survive the Labeling
Act. Courts consistently hold that the Labeling Act preempts
negligent failure to warn claims,100 express warranty claims 101
and fraud and misrepresentation claims, 0 2 but are divided on
negligent sale and design defect because "they are based solely on the alleged
health risks of cigarettes and seek to have a jury reweigh the regulatory bal-
ance of interests arrived at by Congress in the Act"); Sahli v. Manville Corp.,
No. 230512, slip op. at 2 (Contra Costa County Super. Ct., Cal., May 14, 1987)
(holding preempted design defect claims under the risk utility theory because
"[p]laintiff seeks to have a jury reweigh the regulatory balance of interests ar-
rived at by Congress in the Act"); see also Pennington v. Vistron Corp., No. 83-
1332-A, slip op. at 7-8 (M.D. La. Dec. 24, 1987) (holding preempted the risk
utility test of strict liability because "Congress has already conducted its own
'risk-utility' test and has determined that cigarettes, properly labeled, may
lawfully be sold").
Defendants argued on appeal in Pennington that the Labeling Act
preempts all state tort claims because Congress had already weighed the risks
and utility of cigarette smoking, and had decided to allow the sale of properly
labeled cigarettes, and to protect the tobacco industry from the economic bur-
den of non-uniform warnings. Pennington, 876 F.2d at 422. The Fifth Circuit
rejected this argument. Id at 422-23.
100. See Pennington, 876 F.2d at 420 (agreeing with "our sister circuits in
holding that [inadequacy or failure to warn claims are] preempted") (citing
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 235 (6th Cir. 1988);
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 629 (1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v.
American Brands, Inc. 825 F.2d 312, 313 (11th Cir. 1987); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986)).
Pre-1966 failure to warn claims (before the enactment of the Labeling
Act) typically have not been preempted. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 668 (D.N.J. 1986) (allowing plaintiff to maintain a claim
for failure to warn prior to January 1, 1966); Kotler v. American Tobacco Co.,
685 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D. Mass. 1988) (same).
101. Courts have used § 1334(b) and Cipollone's "propriety" part, supra
note 91 and accompanying text, to hold preempted claims for express war-
ranty. See Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 675 (holding that plaintiff's express war-
ranty claim inevitably questions defendants' advertising and promotional
activities), aff'd, 893 F.2d 541, 582 (3d Cir. 1990); accord Coulter v. Philip Mor-
ris, Inc., No. 86-1153-C, slip op. at 2 (Nueces County 94th Jud. Dist. Ct., Tex.,
Jan. 29, 1988) (holding preempted express warranty claims under the original
Cipollone test); Forster, No. 85-4294, slip op. at 10 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct.,
Minn., July 2, 1987) (holding that the breach of express warranty claim "chal-
lenges both the adequacy of the warning provided by Congress on cigarette
packages and the propriety of defendant Reynolds' advertising and promo-
tional practices").
102. Courts have held preempted fraud, or intentional misrepresentation,
claims based on § 1334(b) and Cipollone's "propriety" part, supra note 91 and
accompanying text. See Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 673-74 (holding preempted
intentional tort, fraud, and misrepresentation claims because they all relate to
the promotional activities). Judge Sarokin wrote: "To excuse any manufac-
turer from liability for actively misleading the public or concealing essential
information is done by this court only by compulsion of the Court of Appeals'
mandate." Id. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at
582; see also Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 685 F. Supp. 15, 20 (D. Mass.
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
whether the Labeling Act also preempts claims for strict liabil-
ity 03 and breach of implied warranty.10 4
1988) (holding preempted claims for negligent misrepresentation or deceit,
even if the advertisements were intentionally misleading); Loving v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 48386, slip op. at 3 (Harris County 280th Jud. Dist.
Ct., Tex., Mar. 27, 1987) (holding preempted claims for fraud).
103. Strict liability is the most divisive preemption area. Strict liability im-
poses liability for a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965). Cigarette
plaintiffs' strict liability claims against cigarette manufacturers typically are
based on two theories: inadequate warning and design defect. See Comment,
Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers, supra note 77, at 570.
All courts have held preempted strict liability claims for failure to warn
for the same reasons that negligence claims for failure to warn claims are pre-
empted. See supra note 100. Plaintiffs usually concede that strict liability for
failure to warn is preempted. See, e.g., Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 669 (observ-
ing that "plaintiff's brief.., concedes that his failure to warn theory in Count
3 is preempted under the Court of Appeals decision").
Minnesota applies a risk-utility test to determine if the manufacturer is
strictly liable for a design defect. Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622
(Minn. 1984). Under this test, courts use the following factors to measure
whether a manufacturer has exercised reasonable care in its choice of product
design:
(a) the usefulness and desirability of the product,
(b) the availability of other and safer products to meet the same need,
(c) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness,
(d) the obviousness of the danger,
(e) common knowledge and normal public expectation of the danger,
(f) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (including the
effect of instructions or warnings), and
(g) the ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the
usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive.
Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Minn. 1982) (citing Wade,
Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965)).
Courts applying a risk-utility test have divided on preemption. For cases
holding that design defect claims using the risk-utility test are not preempted,
see Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 669-72 (stating that "the seven-factor Wade test
was intended only to be a set of guiding criteria for courts"). In dicta, the
Third Circuit affirmed. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 582 n.52 (refusing to interpret
the Labeling Act to bar a risk-utility claim); see also Pennington v. Vistron
Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 422-23 (5th Cir. 1989) (allowing risk-utility claims).
For cases holding that risk-utility is preempted, see supra note 99.
A number of courts have held that strict liability claims for design defect
fail as a matter of state law. See, e.g., Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
849 F.2d 230, 235-36 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming the district court's ruling that
cigarettes are not defective or unreasonably dangerous); Gunsalus v. Celotex
Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149, 1157-59 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that tobacco is not a
defective product); accord Ward v. Feist Watson Enterprises, Inc., No. CV 85-
203-M-CCL, slip op. at 9 (D. Mont. July 15, 1988).
104. Because implied warranty is essentially like strict liability, courts typi-
cally do not address implied warranty claims separately. Instead, if a court
holds preempted strict liability claims, it also holds preempted implied war-
ranty claims. See, e.g., Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 85-4294, slip
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This division among courts made the Forster case a fitting
occasion to reexamine the scope of the Labeling Act's preemp-
tion.10s The trend toward increased preemption of common law
claims also demonstrated the need to reevaluate the Labeling
Act's preemptive scope. Because preemption under the Label-
ing Act effectively denies smokers or their survivors an oppor-
tunity to sue cigarette manufacturers,106 it is imperative that
courts make sure they do not improperly bar these claims. This
argument is particularly true because even if smokers prevail
on preemption grounds, they are not entitled automatically to
recover damages; rather, smokers face extremely difficult proof
problems under state law.107
op. at 10 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct., Minn., July 2, 1987) (stating that
"[i]mplied warranties of fitness are essentially identical to strict liability in tort
... Plaintiff's implied warranty claim is therefore preempted on the same
grounds as the strict liability claim" (citation omitted)). Thus, to the extent
that courts are divided on whether to hold preempted strict liability claims,
supra note 103, courts similarly are divided on whether to preempt breach of
implied warranty claims.
105. This was particularly true of strict liability, a theory plaintiffs were
using more frequently in cigarette litigation. See Comment, Liability of Cigar-
ette Manufacturers, supra note 77, at 570 n.10.
106. One district court suggested that it knew of no claims that plaintiff
could bring against a cigarette manufacturer that would survive the Labeling
Act's preemption. Pennington v. Vistron Corp., No. 83-1332-A, slip op. at 8
(M.D. La, Dec. 22, 1987).
Since 1988, courts have dismissed or plaintiffs have dropped 52 tobacco
cases; the total number of suits pending against tobacco companies has de-
clined from 155 cases in 1988 to 59 pending lawsuits in early 1990. See Cohen,
Broader Suits Over Cigarettes May Be Possible, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1990, at A3,
col. 4.
107. For example, even if plaintiffs could bring claims for negligent failure
to warn, they still would face serious burdens in overcoming the assumption of
risk defense. Because courts uniformly have held failure to warn claims pre-
empted, see supra note 100, plaintiffs more commonly bring claims for strict
liability, particularly for design defect. See Note, Tobacco Suits Today, supra
note 20, at 263-64. These claims also are difficult to prove as a matter of state
law. The comment to the Restatement states that good tobacco is not unrea-
sonably dangerous simply because the effects of smoking are harmful. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). For a more
thorough discussion of strict liability problems under state law, see Crist &
Majoras, supra note 77, at 584-90 (arguing that claims for strict liability must
fail because cigarettes are not defective and/or unreasonably dangerous); Gar-
ner, supra note 19, at 1440-48 (discussing potential defenses, including obvi-
ousness and knowledge of the risk); Note, Tobacco Suits Today, supra note 20,
at 263-68 (discussing obstacles to plaintiff's claims).
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II. FORSTER v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO.
A. A NEW PREEMPTION TEST
In Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,' 08 the Minnesota
Supreme Court became the first court since Cipollone to adopt
a new test for determining which state common law claims sur-
vive the Labeling Act. 0 9 Unlike Cipollone, the Forster court
also applied its test to plaintiff's claims, specifically identifying
which claims its test would preempt." 0 Forster thus represents
a significant new chapter in cigarette litigation.
Consistent with other courts, the Forster court determined
that the Labeling Act did not expressly preempt state common
law claims."' The court then analyzed whether the Labeling
Act impliedly preempted common law claims, and summarily
dismissed implied preemption by occupation of the field"2 or
by impossibility." 3 It concluded, however, that the Labeling
Act did impliedly preempt some common law claims that would
frustrate Congress's objectives." 4
In finding implied preemption by frustration of purpose,
the Forster court reasoned that the Labeling Act's purpose
clause reflected a compromise between the interest in protect-
108. 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989).
109. Id. at 660. Other courts either had adopted the Cipollone test, or ex-
panded the test to reflect the Cipollone and Palmer courts' reasoning. See
supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
110. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 661-63. For a discussion of the Forster court's
application of its test to Forster's claims, see infra Part II. B. Cipollone, on
the other hand, adopted a preemption test, but remanded to the trial court to
determine which of plaintiff's claims remained after applying the test. Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1986); see supra note 92
and accompanying text.
111. The Forster court analyzed the preemption clause, and concluded that
"[t]he phrase 'requirement or prohibition * * * imposed under State law' is too
obscure for us to say that it is an express declaration that state common law
tort actions are preempted. Express preemption requires Congress to speak
plainer." Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 658. This holding comports with all other
courts deciding cigarette preemption issues. See supra note 78.
112. The court dismissed "occupation of the field" in a single line of the
opinion:
[I]f federal preemption is to be implied, congressional intent to do so
must be clearly inferred, either from the extent of federal involve-
ment or from the scope of the federal interest; and even then the
state will be preempted only to the extent that state regulation 'actu-
ally conflicts' with federal law.
Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 658 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp, 464 U.S.
238, 248 (1984)).
113. The court simply stated that preemption by physical impossibility was
"not the case here." Id.
114. Id at 658-61.
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ing health and the interest in protecting the country's tobacco
economy. 115 Congress struck that balance, however, by al-
lowing cigarettes to be sold if properly labeled.116 In striking
that balance, Congress declared its waining adequate to inform
the public of health risks."17 More importantly, Congress ex-
pressed a desire for uniform cigarette labeling and advertising
regulations.118 A common law claim for failure to warn would
cause a jury to reevaluate the adequacy of the federal warning,
and assess damages against manufacturers whose warnings
were found wanting.119 Such unpredictable state regulation of
warning requirements, 120 the court found, would directly con-
flict with the Labeling Act's purpose of avoiding "diverse,
nonuniform and confusing" regulations.' 2 '
Having concluded that the Labeling Act impliedly pre-
empted some state common law claims, the Forster court cre-
ated a new preemption test.122 Like Cipollone, the court first
held preempted any claims based on a state-imposed duty to
warn.12S The Forster court, however, rejected the "propriety"
part of the Cipollone test,24 stating "[w]e are unclear what this
means."'2 5 Instead, the court held preempted claims that ques-
115. Id- at 658.
116. Id (stating that "Congress has struck this balance by warning people
they should not smoke if they value their health, but leaving the decision
whether to smoke up to them").
117. The court noted: "Congress has reserved to itself what this warning
will say and where it must be placed. In other words, Congress has declared
its warning is an adequate warning and only its warning need be given." Id- at
658-59.
118. Id. at 659. See also supra notes 33, 51 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the purpose clause).
119. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 659.
120. Id. The court recognized that damage awards could have a regulatory
effect.
121. Id. Although plaintiff argued that Congress would find this conflict
acceptable, the court disagreed absent an affirmative indication in the legisla-
tive history or express statutory language that Congress intended to maintain
conflicting state tort claims. Id at 660.
122. Id.
123. Id Both Cipollone's and Forsters tests preempt claims alleging inade-
quacy of warning or a duty to warn beyond the federal warning label. For the
precise Cipollone language, see supra text accompanying note 90.
124. The Cipollone court held preempted state common law claims that
challenge "the propriety of a party's actions with respect to the advertising
and promotion of cigarettes." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181,
187 (3d Cir. 1986); see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
125. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 660. The Forster court further remarked on Ci-
pollone's "propriety" language: "Presumably the Third Circuit had in mind
the interplay of section 1334(b); namely, that with respect to advertising and
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tion "the adequacy of cigarette advertising or promotion with
respect to smoking and health," or that question "the effect of
that cigarette advertising or promotion on the federal label.' '1 6
B. STATE COMMON LAW CLAIMS ALLOWED UNDER THE
FORSTER TEST
Having creating its preemption test, the Forster court ap-
plied the test to Forster's claims. The court summarily dealt
with the negligent failure to warn,127 derivative, 2 8 and pre-
1966129 claims, but more fully analyzed the claims for strict lia-
bility, misrepresentation, and breach of warranty.
Reynolds argued as a threshold matter that the Labeling
Act preempted any common law claims, such as strict liabil-
ity,130 which based liability on the supposed defective condition
of cigarettes.13 ' Reynolds argued that these claims would de-
stroy Congress's balance in permitting cigarettes with the req-
uisite federal label to be lawfully sold.132 The court rejected
Reynolds' contention, reasoning that this argument assumed
promotion, insofar as it relates to smoking and health, '[n]o requirement or
prohibition shall be imposed under State law."' I&
126. Id Both Cipollone and Forster adopted their preemption test lan-
guage from § 1334(b). For a discussion of § 1334(b), see supra notes 37 and 46
and accompanying text.
127. The court summarily dismissed negligent failure to warn claims. For-
ster, 437 N.W.2d at 662. Plaintiff also alleged negligence in the "manufacture,
sale, and advertising" of Camel cigarettes. Although these claims were vague,
the court held they were not preempted to the extent they did not implicate a
duty to warn. Id at 662.
128. Plaintiff brought two derivative claims, one for loss of consortium and
the other for punitive damages. The court believed that neither claim war-
ranted independent discussion, but it did note that failure to warn could not be
a factor bearing on punitive damages. Id at 662-63.
129. Because the Labeling Act went into effect on January 1, 1966, failure
to warn and other claims before that date typically have not been held pre-
empted. See supra note 100. Forster made no separate pre-Labeling Act
claims. The court noted, however, that plaintiff had begun smoking in 1953,
and in dicta stated that pre-1966 claims were not preempted. Forster, 437
N.W.2d at 663.
130. Strict liability imposes liability for a product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965). Cigarette plaintiffs typically plead strict liability claims on two
theories: inadequate warning and design defect. See supra note 103.
131. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 660-61.
132. Id Reynolds relied on the Cipollone and Palmer balancing reasoning.
See supra notes 85-89 and 95-97 and accompanying text. Some courts have
used this balancing argument to hold preempted strict liability under the risk-
utility test. See supra note 99. For a more detailed explanation of the cigar-
ette manufacturer's position, see Crist & Majoras, supra note 77, at 580-81.
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the thrust of Forster's lawsuit was effectively to outlaw cigar-
ettes by means of common law actions.133 This assumption, it
found, claimed "too much for state common law tort actions";
although plaintiffs might hope cigarette manufacturers would
go out of business, the common law suits were not based on any
claim that selling cigarettes was illegal.13 The court thus held
that the Labeling Act does not automatically preempt common
law claims that assert cigarettes are in a defective condition. 35
The Forster court then considered plaintiff's strict liability
claims for failure to warn and design defect.136 Although it
summarily held preempted strict liability for failure to warn,137
the court allowed strict liability claims for design defect that
use the risk-utility test.138 Reynolds argued that risk-utility
must be preempted because Congress already had analyzed the
risk-utility factors, and nevertheless permitted the sale of cigar-
ettes.139 The Forster court rejected this argument, contending
133. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 660-61.
134. Id-
135. With respect to strict liability for defective condition, the court found
no conflict with the Labeling Act as long as Forster did not implicate inade-
quacy of warning. Id at 661. The court noted that strict liability claims for
defective condition remained exposed to Reynolds' state law defenses. Id at
661 n.8.
136. Id at 661. The complaint did not clearly state these claims. For exam-
ple, plaintiff's complaint alleged: that the defendants, in selling and advertis-
ing cigarettes, failed to warn adequately of the adverse health consequences;
that the manner of the defendant's advertising neutralized and made ineffec-
tive any warnings; that the product presented a risk of harm greater than its
social utility; and that the product was represented as safe for use, but was in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its use, hence making defend-
ants strictly liable in tort. Id The court concluded this language constituted
an allegation of strict liability. Id
137. The court held preempted strict liability for failure to warn "for rea-
sons already given." Id (citation omitted).
138. Id at 661. Minnesota law uses a risk-utility balancing test to deter-
mine if a products liability claim will lie for a design defect. For a more com-
plete discussion of risk-utility, see supra note 103.
139. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 661. For the risk utility factors, see supra note
103.
At the Forster district court level, Judge Lebedoff held preempted strict
liability claims under the risk-utility test:
As to plaintiffs' claim that defendants' cigarettes were "defective" in
that risk of harm associated with them greatly outweighed any social
utility, such a claim directly challenges the adequacy of Congress'
warning and is thus preempted .... A claim that cigarettes are so in-
herently dangerous that they cannot be sold without tort liability
clearly attacks the propriety of defendants' action in promoting and
marketing its product.
Forster, No. 85-4294, slip op. at 9-10 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct., Mlinn., July 2,
1987).
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that strict liability assumes the product is usable, and instead
questions whether the product is safely designed.1 40 Applying a
risk-utility balancing test, the court concluded, did not conflict
with Congress's purposes.14
Plaintiff also pleaded intentional misrepresentation. 142
Reynolds responded that intentional misrepresentation neces-
sarily involves a duty to warn. 143 The court rejected this argu-
ment, reasoning that intentional misrepresentation was based
not on a duty to warn, 144 but on a duty to tell the truth. 45 To
hold otherwise, the court asserted, would assume that "Con-
gress intended the Act to be a license to lie."'1 46 The Forster
court found proof of congressional intent to prevent intentional
misrepresentation in the Labeling Act's FTC provisions. 47 The
court thus held that a claim for intentional misrepresentation
was not preempted. 48
140. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 661 (stating that "[t]his congressional policy de-
cision is not.., what products liability has in mind").
141. Id. The Forster court did not discuss the seven risk-utility factors, one
of which is the effect of warnings. See supra note 103.
142. The plaintiff did not precisely make this claim. Plaintiff's complaint
asserted that cigarettes were represented as safe for use and were advertised
as safe and nonhazardous. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 661-62. Although character-
izing this as "sparsely pleaded," the court concluded it constituted a claim for
intentional misrepresentation. Id
Although Forster did not plead fraudulent concealment of information,
the court in dicta stated that such a claim was preempted, reasoning that it
was only "a variation of the duty to warn." HdL at 662.
143. Id- at 662.
144. The court asserted that the duty to warn assumes truthfulness and
asks only how much of what was truthful must be disclosed. Id.
145. I& (noting that "the cause of action, in a preemption sense, does not
lie in challenging the adequacy of the federal warning nor in claiming a dilu-
tion of that warning, but only in asserting the falsity of what the cigarette
manufacturer has chosen to say").
146. I& The court noted that this assumption was "uncharitable to Con-
gress and violative of this state's deep concern for honesty as well as health."
Id.
147. Id. The Labeling Act provides for FTC action if a cigarette manufac-
turer engages in deceitful advertising. See supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
To further support its holding, the Forster court noted that the Cipollone
jury considered a claim for post-1966 intentional misrepresentation. Forster,
437 N.W.2d at 662 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487,
1499-1500 (D.N.J. 1988)). This statement is inaccurate. The jury considered
only pre-1966 fraudulent concealment by defendant cigarette manufacturers.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 553 (3d Cir. 1990).
148. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 662. Once past preemption, the plaintiff would
have to prove each element of intentional misrepresentation. Id. at 662. The
court noted that allowing intentional misrepresentation claims might conflict
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Plaintiff also alleged breaches of express and implied war-
ranty. 4 9 The Forster court held these claims preempted only
to the extent they implicated a duty to warn.1 50 Because war-
ranty claims are similar to strict liability, the court applied
strict liability analysis.' 5 ' The court also applied its earlier
analysis of intentional misrepresentation to breach of express
warranty claims.152
III. FORSTER: A NEW NATIONAL MODEL
Although not binding precedent outside of Minnesota, For-
ster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. should replace Cipollone and
Palmer as the national model for determining which common
law claims survive the Labeling Act. Forster correctly limits
the Labeling Act's preemptive reach to failure to warn claims.
Limited preemption properly matches Congress's intent in the
Labeling Act. Further, Forster corrects several problems with
the Cipollone and Palmer cases and their progeny: it preempts
fewer claims, rejects the overly broad application of balancing
reasoning, and properly weighs the presumption against pre-
emption. Finally, the Forster decision makes good policy sense
by allowing injured plaintiffs an opportunity to prove their
claims.
A. PROPER SCOPE OF PREEMPTION
1. The Labeling Act's Preemptive Scope under Forster
In applying its preemption test, the Forster court held pre-
empted only claims that implicated failure to warn or inade-
quacy of warning. For example, the court held preempted
failure to warn and fraudulent concealment of information
claims as implicating a duty to warn beyond that imposed by
indirectly with the Labeling Act, but asserted that any conflict was "self-im-
posed" by the manufacturer. Id.
149. id- The district court held preempted both express and implied war-
ranty claims. Forster, No. 85-4294, slip op. at 10 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct.,
Minn., July 2, 1987).
150. The court noted that these claims still were subject to state law de-
fenses. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 662.
151. Id; see also supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text (discussing the
Forster court's reasoning with respect to strict liability).
152. The court noted that advertisements stating that "A good cigarette can
cause no ills," or "Nose, throat, and accessory organs not adversely affected by
smoking Chesterfields," would be actionable for either intentional misrepre-
sentation or express warranty. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 662. For an analysis of
the Forster court's reasoning on intentional misrepresentation, see supra notes
142-48 and accompanying text.
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the federal warning label.'5 3 The court allowed claims for strict
liability (under risk-utility theory), intentional misrepresenta-
tion, and breach of implied and express warranty, as long as
those claims did not implicate a breach of the duty to warn or
inadequacy of warning.'5 Preempting only those claims that
implicate failure to warn or inadequacy of warning comports
with Congress's intent in the Labeling Act. 155
2. Congress's Intended Preemption in the Labeling Act
Whether Congress specifically intended to preempt state
common law claims in the Labeling Act is not clear. 56
Although the Labeling Act contains a preemption clause, that
clause does not explicitly preempt state common law claims.157
Analysis of the Labeling Act's original language, later amend-
153. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 661-62; see supra notes 127 and 142 and accom-
panying text.
154. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 661-62. For a discussion of the Forster analysis
on these claims, see supra Part II. B. For each claim, the Forster court made
apparent that it preempted claims that involved a failure to warn or inade-
quacy of warning: strict liability ("aside from the duty to warn, there is no
federal preemption for claims based on a 'defective' condition of the product");
risk-utility ("if plaintiff can prove a defective condition or a defective design
- apart from any claim of inadequacy of warning - we see no conflict with
the federal Act") (footnote omitted); intentional misrepresentation (stating
that this cause of action, "in a preemption sense, does not lie in challenging
the adequacy of the federal warning nor in claiming a dilution of that warning,
but only in asserting the falsity of what the cigarette manufacturer has chosen
to say"); warranty ("[t]o the extent a breach of warranty is based on a duty to
warn it is preempted"); negligence ("[t]o the extent negligence is claimed to be
a breach of a duty to warn about the hazards of smoking, it is preempted").
Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 661-62.
155. See infra Part III. A. 2.
156. Commentators have argued on both sides of this issue. For a compre-
hensive list of articles, see supra note 77.
For the argument that Congress did not intend to preempt any common
law claims, see Note, supra note 58, at 880-86, 910-11; Comment, Common Law
Claims, supra note 77, at 758-64. These authors point to congressional debate
before passage of the 1965 Act that recognized the continued existence of com-
mon-law products liability cases, and the negative effect these warnings might
have on a plaintiff's case. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REc. 16,543-44 (1965) (statement
of Rep. Fascell) (stating that "[t]he legislative record makes it clear that pas-
sage of this law and compliance by the manufacturer in no way affects the
right to raise the defense of 'assumption of risk.' "); see also infra notes 174-76
and accompanying text (discussing the 1969 Senate Report).
For the contrary argument that Congress intended to preempt all state
common law claims, see Crist & Majoras, supra note 77, at 566-82; see also in-
fra notes 169-72 and accompanying text (discussing evidence of congressional
intent to preempt state common law claims).
157. See supra notes 34-37 and 46 and accompanying text. No court has
found express preemption of state common law claims. See supra note 78.
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ments, and legislative history, however, indicates that Congress
had one principal objective: to inform the public of the dangers
of smoking through uniform warnings.158 To accomplish this
objective, Congress preempted any other warning requirement
on cigarette packages and advertisements.159 Common law
claims for failure to warn would conflict with this objective and
therefore are preempted.160
a. Congress's Principal Objective
The 1965 Labeling Act's purpose and preemption clauses
reflect Congress's intent to preempt any non-uniform warning
requirement on cigarette packages. In the Act's purpose clause,
Congress communicated three policies: 1) to inform the public
of health risks by including a warning on each package of cigar-
ettes; 2) to protect the national economy "to the maximum ex-
tent consistent" with its first policy; and 3) to insure uniform
labeling and advertising regulations.161 These policies, how-
ever, were not of equal importance. Of primary importance
was the purpose of informing the public of health risks associ-
ated with smoking.' 62
To accomplish this purpose, Congress required a specific
warning label on all cigarette packages. 163 In requiring such a
warning, however, Congress intended to prevent non-uniform
state warning label requirements. It initially expressed this
concern in the purpose clause.'6 In addition, Congress in-
cluded a preemption clause, forbidding conflicting warnings on
cigarette packages, and prohibiting any warnings on cigarette
advertisements if the advertised cigarette packages carried the
label required by the Labeling Act.1 65 Congress thus demon-
158. See infra notes 161-68, 177-82 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 164-65, 177-82 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
161. 1965 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982); see supra notes 32-33, 51 and accom-
panying text.
162. The purpose clause stated that Congress sought to protect the national
economy only "to the maximum extent consistent with" its purpose of inform-
ing the public of health risks. 1965 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982); see supra note
33. Legislative history discussed above also demonstrates that Congress's pri-
mary purpose was to warn the public. See supra note 32 and accompanying
text.
163. 1965 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982); see supra text accompanying note 31.
164. 1965 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982); see supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
165. 1965 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1334; see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying
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strated its principal objective of not only warning the public,
but doing so in a consistent and uniform manner.
b. The 1969 Amendments to Subsection 1334(b): Congress
Demonstrates its Continued Objective of Uniform
Warnings on Cigarette Packages and
Advertisements
In 1969, Congress amended the Labeling Act, making two
significant changes. 166 Congress allowed the FTC to order
warnings on print advertisements after July 1, 1971.167 Con-
gress also amended subsection 1334(b) of the preemption clause
to preempt any "requirement or prohibition on smoking and
health ... under State law with respect to the advertising or
promotion" of any cigarette packages that complied with the
Labeling Act.168
Congress's intent in amending subsection 1334(b), particu-
larly the addition of the words "under State law," is the crux of
the preemption debate. Cigarette manufacturers argue that
this amendment reflects Congress's intent to preempt state
common law claims.169 They emphasize the addition of the
words "under State law,"'170 and the Conference Committee's
rejection of a 1969 Senate amendment that would have limited
preemption to requirements imposed by "state statute or regu-
lation." -7 ' Cigarette manufacturers also point out that Con-
166. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84
Stat. 87 (1970); see supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
167. The FTC was required to give Congress six months notice. See supra
note 45 and accompanying text.
168. 1969 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1982) (emphasis added); see supra note
46 and accompanying text. The 1965 Act had read: "No statement relating to
smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chap-
ter." 1965 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1982); see supra note 37.
Subsection 1334(a), which preempted any other warning labels on cigar-
ette packages, was not amended. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Crist & Majoras, supra note 77, at 560-66. At the time their
article was published, both authors were attorneys for the law firm that repre-
sented R.J. Reynolds in its smoking and health cases. Id at 551.
170. 1965 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1982), did not include the term "state
law" and simply provided: "No statement relating to smoking and health shall
be required in the advertising of cigarettes the packages of which are labeled
in conformity with the provisions of this Act." See supra notes 37, 46 and ac-
companying text.
171. The proposed amendment read: "No other requirement prohibition
[sic] based on smoking and health shall be imposed by any state statute or reg-
ulation with respect to advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages
of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act." See S.
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gress in 1984 rejected a proposal to amend section 1334 to
include a clause that saved common law claims from
preemption. 7 2
Plaintiffs' attorneys, however, argue that Congress did not
intend the 1969 amendments to preempt common law claims. 173
For example, the 1969 Senate Report summarized the change
to subsection 1334(b) as prohibiting regulation or prohibition of
cigarette advertising by "State or local authority."174 Further,
debate surrounding the 1969 amendment to the preemption
clause targeted state regulation, not common law. 75 Finally,
the 1969 Act defined "State" as any "political subdivision of any
state."176
Examining subsection 1334(b)'s original language and the
1969 amendments, however, reveals that Congress in the 1969
amendments intended only to reinforce its principal objective
of warning the public through uniform labels, while allowing
the FTC to require warning labels on cigarette advertisements.
As enacted, subsection 1334(b) preempted any warning require-
REP. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1969) (emphasis added). The Conference
Committee rejected the Senate's proposed language. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No.
897, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970). Congress then adopted the current version of
subsection 1334(b). See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
172. The bill, H.R. 3979, would have included the following savings clause:
"Compliance with any requirement of Section 4 or 7 of this Act shall not re-
lieve any person from liability at common law or under state statutory law to
any other person." H.R. 3979, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1983). The House
Committee, however, deleted this provision. See H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12-22, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3718,
3725-35 (describing Committee's proposed changes to H.R. 3979; these changes
did not include the savings clause).
173. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 7-10, Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 423 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1989) (No. Cl-87-2170).
174. S. REP. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2652, 2652 (stating that the bill "[p]rohibits health-re-
lated regulation or prohibition of cigarette advertising by any State or local
authority").
175. The Senate report stated that "[t]his preemption is intended to include
not only action by State statute but by all other administrative actions or local
ordinances or regulations by any political subdivision of any State." See S.
REP. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2652, 2663. Similarly, the Conference Committee report re-
ported that the amendment made "clear that the preemption applies to cities,
counties, and other political subdivisions of the States as well as to the States
themselves." See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 897, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEWS 2676, 2677.
176. "As a perfecting amendment, an additional sentence has been added to
the definition of 'State' ... which makes it clear that the term 'State' includes
any political subdivision of any State." See S. REP. No. 566, 91st Cong, 1st Sess.
12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMi. NEWS 2652, 2663.
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ment, from a state or a federal agency, on cigarette advertise-
ments as long as the cigarettes advertised were properly
labeled.1 7 7 In 1969, at the same time that Congress changed the
language of subsection 1334(b) to include the phrase "under
state law," Congress also gave the FTC, a federal agency, the
right to require warnings on advertisements.178 Thus, although
under the 1965 version of subsection 1334(b) the FTC could not
have required any "statement relating to smoking and health"
on cigarette advertisements, 179 the 1969 amendment freed the
FTC to do so.18 0 Accordingly, Congress amended subsection
1334(b) to clarify that states, but not the FTC, were prohibited
from requiring warning labels on advertisements.
The legislative history of the 1969 amendments also dem-
onstrates that Congress intended to maintain its objective of
uniform warning requirements, while permitting the FTC to
require warnings on advertisements. For example, the Senate
Report stated that the amendment preempted state warning re-
quirements "to avoid the chaos created by a multiplicity of con-
flicting regulations." 8's In addition, the Conference Report
stated that the House bill contained a blanket preemption ap-
plicable to federal agencies as well as to state and local govern-
ments; this blanket preemption was changed to apply only to
states.18 2
177. Subsection 1334(a) applied to cigarette packages, and was not
amended. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
180. The FTC did require the same warning on advertising as Congress re-
quired on cigarette packages. See supra note 45. In 1984, Congress amended
the Labeling Act to require the same warning labels on advertisements and
billboards as on cigarette packages. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying
text.
181. S. REP. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADImN. NEWS 2652, 2663.
182. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 897, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 2676, 2677. The Conference Committee ex-
plained the amendment as follows:
The House bill contained a blanket preemption (applicable to all
Federal departments and agencies as well as State and local govern-
ments) with respect to requiring statements relating to smoking and
health in advertisements of cigarettes the packages of which were la-
beled in conformity with the legislation.
The Senate preemption applied only to States and their political
divisions. They were prevented from imposing any requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health on advertising and promo-
tions of cigarettes in packages labeled in accordance with the Act.
With minor technical amendments the conference version is the same
as the Senate amendment.
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c. Failure to Warn Claims Would Conflict with Congress's
Clear Purpose and Therefore are Preempted
Congress demonstrated a continued clear objective of in-
forming the public through uniform and consistent warnings,
and a desire to preempt any state requirements for inconsistent
warnings on cigarette packages and advertisements.1 8 3 Given
this clear objective, state common law claims that in effect re-
quire different warning labels conflict with Congress's intent,
and should be preempted. State common law claims that impli-
cate failure to warn or inadequacy of warning would require
cigarette manufacturers to change warning labels, and thus
these claims conflict with the Labeling Act.
A failure to warn claim requires a jury to evaluate the
cigarette's warning label, and imposes liability on a manufac-
turer whose warning is found inadequate, even if the manufac-
turer complied with the Labeling Act.'- 4 A damage award for
failure to warn encourages a manufacturer to strengthen its
warning label to avoid future liability.L8 5 Moreover, because
each state has its own tort law, state courts inevitably would
reach contradictory holdings. These inconsistent holdings
would cause manufacturers to place different warnings on
cigarette packages and advertisements depending on the deci-
sions in that location, a result directly in conflict with Con-
gress's principal objective of a uniform warning system. 8 6
Common law claims conflict with the Labeling Act when
the common law would require a different warning than the
Labeling Act.18 7 Only common law claims that allege a failure
to warn or that question the adequacy of the warning label
would cause a cigarette manufacturer to change the warning la-
I&. e
183. See supra notes 161-82 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627-28 (1st Cir.
1987). The Palmer court noted:
Once a jury has found a label inadequate under state law, and the
manufacturer liable for damages for negligently employing it, it is un-
thinkable that any manufacturer would not immediately take steps to
minimize its exposure to continued liability. The most obvious change
it can take, of course, is to change its label.
Id.
186. See Comment, Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers, supra note 77, at
582-84 (arguing that awarding damages for inadequacy of warning claims
would cause contradictory state tort law and conflict with the Labeling Act).
187. Congress has demonstrated its concern for uniform warning require-
ments. See supra notes 161-65, 177-82 and accompanying text.
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bel, and thereby lead to non-uniform warnings. 8" Thus, only
failure to warn and inadequacy of warning claims conflict with
Congress's purpose and should be preempted.
B. CORRECTING PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM CIPOLLONE AND
PALMER
In addition to properly following congressional intent, the
Forster court remedied three problems with the Cipol-
lone/Palmer test. The Forster test preempts fewer claims than
Cipollone, rejects the balancing analysis other post-Cipollone
courts have used to hold preempted additional common law
claims, and properly weighs the presumption against preemp-
tion to permit common law claims that do not clearly conflict
with the Labeling Act.
1. The Flawed Cipollone Test
The Cipollone court developed the first preemption test for
determining which common law claims survive the Labeling
Act. 8 9 The "propriety" part of that test,19° however, allows
courts to hold preempted more claims than Congress in-
tended,191 including claims that challenge the "propriety" of a
manufacturer's advertising, even if those claims do not impli-
cate the duty to warn. For example, post-Cipollone courts in-
terpreted the "propriety" part of the Cipollone preemption test
as preempting claims for express warranty and fraud.192
Forster properly preempts only common law claims that
188. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text. For example, assume
that plaintiff wins a lawsuit claiming that the cigarette company could have
manufactured a "safer" cigarette. A damage award from such a lawsuit would
not cause the cigarette company to change its warning label, but instead would
cause the company to develop a "safer" cigarette.
189. Cipollone held preempted state common law claims that challenge the
adequacy of warnings on cigarette packages, or that necessarily presume a
duty to provide a warning beyond that required by the Labeling Act. Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986). Cipollone also held
preempted claims that challenge "the propriety of a party's actions with re-
spect to the advertising and promotion of cigarettes." Id.; see supra notes 90-91
and accompanying text.
190. For the language of the "propriety" part of the Cipollone test, see
supra text accompanying note 91.
191. See supra Part In. A.
192. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (discussing the preemp-
tion of express warranty and fraud claims); see also Crist & Majoras, supra
note 77, at 575-77 (arguing that misrepresentation and express warranty claims
are an explicit challenge to "the propriety of a party's actions with respect to
the advertising and promotion of cigarettes").
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implicate inadequacy or failure to warn. For example, the For-
ster court held express warranty claims preempted only if they
implicated the duty to warn. 93 The Forster court refused, how-
ever, to hold preempted claims for intentional misrepresenta-
tion, stating that those claims do not challenge the adequacy of
the federal warning, but rather challenge the truth of a manu-
facturer's advertisement. 94 Thus, Forster narrows the preemp-
tion scope to failure to warn, and corrects the overbroad
preemption caused by the "propriety" part of the Cipollone
test.
2. Inappropriate Use of the Balancing Analysis
Cipollone and Palmer emphasized Congress's careful bal-
ancing of its dual interests in informing the public and protect-
ing the national economy.' 95 Because common law claims could
upset Congress's careful balance, both courts concluded that
the preemptive scope of the Labeling Act included common law
claims. 96
This balancing logic, however, is flawed. Both courts mis-
construe the purpose clause as creating an equal balance be-
tween the two interests of informing the public and protecting
the national economy.' 97 The purpose clause and the legislative
history, however, suggest that Congress primarily intended to
193. Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 662 (Minn.
1989); see supra notes 149-52, 154.
194. Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 662; see supra notes 142-48, 154 and accompany-
ing text.
195. See supra notes 85-89 and 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing the
Cipollone and Palmer "balancing" reasoning).
196. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986);
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir. 1987); see also supra
notes 85-89 and 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing Cipollone and
Palmer). An award of damages from state common law suits would have a
regulatory effect on cigarette manufacturers, the courts decided, and would tip
the Act's balance of purposes.
197. See, e.g., Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187 (stating that the purposes clause in
15 U.S.C. § 1331 reflects a "carefully drawn balance between the purposes of
warning the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking and protecting the in-
terests of national economy"). The Palmer court stated:
It is these policies, and more importantly, the balance fixed between
them that is our focus ... Congress ran a hard-fought, bitterly parti-
san battle in striking the compromise that became the Act. It is in-
conceivable that Congress intended to have that carefully wrought
balance of national interests superseded by the views of a single state,
indeed, perhaps of a single jury in a single state.
Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626.
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inform the public.198 Thus, Cipollone and Palmer's interest in
maintaining a careful balance is misplaced.
Based on this flawed balancing analysis, however, some
later courts expanded the Cipollone test to preempt common
law claims that upset Congress's balance. 99 By expanding the
Cipollone test, these courts held preempted additional state
common law claims, in particular strict liability claims.2°° Fur-
ther, cigarette manufacturers have seized on the balancing rea-
soning as a device to extinguish all cigarette claims, arguing
that all common law claims upset Congress's careful balance.201
Using this balancing analysis to preempt common law
claims is contrary to both Congress's intent and to recent
Supreme Court preemption principles. Such balancing analysis
creates a broad test, capable of holding preempted nearly all
common law claims.20 2 Had Congress intended such a far-
reaching preemptive scope, it would have occupied the field re-
lating to regulation of cigarettes; no court, however, has held
that Congress intended such a broad scope of regulation.20 3
In addition, the Supreme Court has been increasingly re-
luctant to preempt state law based on a balancing theory. In
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.,204 the Court assumed that the
Williams Act, a federal law regulating takeovers, represented a
careful balance between the interests of offerors and target
companies, and that state statutes upsetting this balance were
preempted.20 5 Despite these assumptions, the Court held that
the Williams Act still did not preempt an Indiana law that se-
198. See supra notes 32, 161-62 and accompanying text; see also Comment,
Federal Cigarette Labeling, supra note 77, at 885-86 (arguing that the language
of the Labeling Act suggests a "hierarchy of purpose").
199. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
200. Courts using this added clause have held preempted claims for strict
liability, claims which survived the original Cipollone test. See supra notes 99
and 105 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 97 and 99 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 97, 99 and text accompanying note 201.
203. The Cipollone court did not find occupation of the field. Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 1986); see supra note 83 and ac-
companying text. The Palmer court did not address occupation of the field,
but found instead that common law claims conflicted with Congress's purpose.
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir. 1987); see supra notes
93-97 and accompanying text. Later courts adopted the Cipollone test, and
similarly did not find occupation of the field. See, e.g., Roysdon v. R.J. Reyn-
olds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234 (6th Cir. 1988); see supra note 98 and ac-
companying text.
204. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
205. Id. at 80 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632-34 (1982)).
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verely curtailed hostile corporate takeovers.20 6
Forster, like Cipollone and Palmer, found an equal balance
in the interests of informing the public and protecting the econ-
omy.20 7 The court, however, correctly refused to hold pre-
empted common law claims that upset Congress's balance. For
example, it expressly rejected Reynolds' argument that claims
alleging a defective condition of cigarettes should be preempted
because those claims would destroy the Labeling Act's balance
of purposes.208 Instead, Forster asserted that Congress already
had struck the balance between warning the public and protect-
ing the economy by allowing the sale of cigarettes that carried
the warning label.20 9
3. Weighing the Presumption against Preemption
In analyzing preemption cases, courts begin with the strong
presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt state law,
absent a clear indication to the contrary.21 0 After considering
this presumption, the Cipollone court refused to find "occupa-
tion of the field" relating to cigarettes and health.211 The
evolution of cigarette preemption law since Cipollone reflects a
noticeable shifting of that presumption. Post-Cipollone courts
have expanded the preemption scope, causing additional claims
to fall within the Labeling Act's grasp.2 12 With this increased
scope of preemption, subsequent courts in effect have held the
206. Id- at 86-87. The Indiana law in effect required prior approval by a
majority of disinterested shareholders before a takeover for corporations in-
corporated in the state of Indiana. Id at 72-75. Both the district court and the
Seventh Circuit had held that the Williams Act preempted the state law. Dy-
namics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 262-63 (7th Cir. 1986). The Supreme
Court held that the purpose of the Indiana law did not frustrate the federal
purposes, even though "[v]ery few tender offers could run the gauntlet that
Indiana has set up." IH at 263.
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's recent views on preemption, see
Rotunda, supra note 69, at 311-19.
207. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
211. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 1986); see
supra note 83 and accompanying text. One commentator has argued that the
Cipollone court shifted this presumption by holding preempted any state com-
mon law claims. See Note, Has Federalism Gone Up In Smoke?, supra note 77,
at 805-08 (arguing that the Cipollone court departed from traditional notions of
federalism and tipped the balance against providing a remedy for injured state
citizens).
212. See supra notes 99 and 103 and accompanying text.
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field of smoking and health "occupied,"2 13 a result Cipollone
expressly rejected as shifting the presumption against
preemption.214
Forster runs counter to this trend by giving proper weight
to the presumption against preemption. Noting the state's
strong interest in protecting its citizens' health and safety, the
court limited the scope of preemption to only those common
law claims that directly conflict with Congress's clear objective
in the preemption clause - preventing non-uniform warning
labels.215 Forster thus properly balanced the federal Labeling
Act with a state's right to allow an injured citizen to obtain a
remedy. This presumption is particularly appropriate in cigar-
ette cases, in which the plaintiff, once past the preemption is-
sue, still faces difficult proof problems under state law.2 1 6
C. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS SUPPORT THE FORSTER RESULT
Forster is an appropriate judicial interpretation of federal
legislation. The decision adequately allays federalism con-
cerns,217 preempting only those common law claims that di-
rectly conflict with the Labeling Act's objective,218 and thus
preserves a state's right to exercise its police power interest in
the health and safety of its citizens. Forster also allows injured
plaintiffs an opportunity to prove their claims, and to obtain a
remedy.219 Expansive preemption tests, developed by some
courts before Forster,220 effectively eliminate all recourse for
injured plaintiffs.
As a broader policy matter, Forster appropriately reduces
the blanket immunity from tort liability that cigarette manu-
facturers have enjoyed. Other industries are held liable for in-
juries caused by their dangerous products, 22 ' yet the tobacco
213. Some courts have held preempted all claims in a tobacco lawsuit. See
Forster, No. 85-4294, slip op. at 1-3, 12 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct., Minn., July
2, 1987) (granting summary judgment for defendant by holding preempted
negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and misrepresentation). In
Pennington v. Vistron Corp., the district court held that the Act preempted all
of plaintiff's post-1965 claims, including failure to warn and strict liability. See
Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 418-19 n.4 (5th Cir. 1989).
214. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 186; see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
215. See supra Part III. A.
216. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Part III. A.
219. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
221. See Garner, supra note 19, at 1423-24 (noting that the automobile,
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industry, most recently because of preemption, has defeated all
attempts to hold it accountable for injuries its product
causes.222 This immunity is strikingly ironic when one consid-
ers that cigarette smoking is responsible for more than one of
every six deaths in the United States.
223
IV. FORSTER: RIGHT RESULT, WEAK TEST
Unlike other courts following Cipollone and Palmer, the
Forster court developed a new preemption test, preempting
common law claims based on a state-imposed duty to warn, or
common law claims that question "the adequacy of cigarette ad-
vertising or promotion with respect to smoking and health," or
"the effect of cigarette advertising or promotion of the federal
label. '224 When analyzing Forster's claims, however, the court
did not follow this stated test. Instead, it held preempted only
claims that involved a duty to warn or inadequacy of
warning.225
The claims of intentional misrepresentation and breach of
warranty illustrate the problem with Forster's stated preemp-
tion test. Cigarette manufacturers may argue that these claims
are preempted because the claims in fact do question "the ade-
quacy of cigarette advertising or promotion with respect to
smoking and health." The Forster court nevertheless did not
hold intentional misrepresentation or breach of warranty
claims preempted, as long as they did not implicate a duty to
warn.2 26 Thus, the Forster test can be interpreted more broadly
than it was applied, in a way that the Forster court obviously
did not intend, and in a manner contrary to congressional
intent.227
Because of this inconsistency between the Forster test and
the common law claims that Forster held preempted, subse-
quent courts may use the test's language to hold preempted ad-
ditional claims contrary to Forster's result. Forster would have
provided clearer guidance had its test simply stated that the La-
beling Act preempted common law claims that implicated a
drug, and machine tool industries all have been held liable for injuries, while
cigarette manufacturers have not).
222. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
225. See supra Part II. B. and note 154.
226. See supra notes 142-52, 154 and accompanying text.
227. See supra Part III. A.
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duty to warn, or claimed inadequacy of warning on cigarette
packages and in cigarette advertisements.
CONCLUSION
Since the landmark case of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
courts applying the preemption doctrine have allowed fewer
common law claims for injured smokers. In Forster v. RlJ.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court reexam-
ined the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, and
held preempted only those claims that implicated a failure to
warn or inadequacy of warning. Although the court could have
stated a clearer test for determining what claims were pre-
empted, it nevertheless reached the right result. Forster's lim-
ited preemption is more consistent with the Labeling Act's
language and legislative history than the currently prevailing
test, and also is desirable for policy reasons, including federal-
ism concerns and reducing the immunity from liability cigar-
ette manufacturers presently enjoy. As courts recognize the
positive attributes of this approach to cigarette litigation pre-
emption, Forster should become the prevailing standard
throughout this nation.
Carolyn Brue-Legried
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